AIDS: The Responsibility to Care by Forrester, D. Anthony
Volume 34 Issue 5 Article 3 
1989 
AIDS: The Responsibility to Care 
D. Anthony Forrester 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr 
 Part of the Health Law and Policy Commons 
Recommended Citation 
D. A. Forrester, AIDS: The Responsibility to Care, 34 Vill. L. Rev. 799 (1989). 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol34/iss5/3 
This Symposia is brought to you for free and open access by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Villanova Law Review by an authorized editor of Villanova 
University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. 
19891
AIDS: THE RESPONSIBILITY TO CARE
D. ANTHONY FORRESTER*
"Our privileges can be no greater than our obligations.
The protection of our rights can endure no longer than
the performance of our responsibilities."'
INCE the first cases of acquired immunodeficiency syndrome
(AIDS) were reported among members of the gay community
in the United States in 1981, the human immunodeficiency virus
(HIV) that causes AIDS and AIDS-related conditions (ARC) has
precipitated a pandemic unprecedented in modern history. It is
currently estimated that about 175,000. Americans will be persons
with AIDS or ARC (PWAs) by 1991 and approximately 1.5 million
people in the United States are already infected with HIV.2 Over
130 countries throughout the world have reported cases of
AIDS,:3 and it is anticipated that in the next five years there will be
as many as one million new cases of AIDS worldwide. 4 Thus,
AIDS is a vastly complex, global phenomenon with extraordinary
social, cultural, economic and political dimensions and impact.
The worldwide fear and hysteria AIDS has engendered is un-
precedented in contemporary society. The profound scope of the
AIDS pandemic forces all segments of society to reexamine their
values and to address many troublesome legal and ethical issues.
Health care and legal professionals are not exempt. Many of
these issues are born of the unique epidemiological features of
this disease and the pervasive social stigma attached to those af-
flicted with it. From the perspective of health care providers and
* Ph.D., R.N. Associate Professor, Department of Nursing Education, Uni-
versity of Medicine and Dentistry of NewJersey, Newark, NewJersey and Regis-
tered Nurse (per diem), Adult Emergency Department, Mount Sinai Medical
Center, New York, New York.
1. Address by John F. Kennedy, Vanderbilt University (May 18, 1963), re-
printed in THE INTERNATIONAL THESAURUS OF QUOTATIONS 546 (1970).
2. Heyward & Curran, The Epidemiology of AIDS in the U.S., Sci. AM., Oct.
1988, at 72, 80 (Public Health Service estimate).
3. Update. Acquired Immnnodeficiency Syndrome (AIDS)- IWorldwide, 37 MORBID-
ITY & MORTALITY WEEKLY REP. 286, 286 (1988) ("As of March 21, 1988, 136
countries throughout the world had reported a total of 84,256 cases of acquired
immunodeficiency syndrome.").
4. Mann, Chin, Piot & Quinn, The International Epidemiology of AIDS, Sci.
AM., Oct. 1988, at 82, 82 (estimation based on epidemiological studies) [herein-
after International Epidemiology].
(799)
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legal professionals, this stigma may be viewed as much a part of
the pathology of AIDS as the virus itself.
Exploring factors contributing to the stigmatization of PWAs
may be helpful in formulating an understanding of the challenges
health and legal professionals must address during this pandemic.
A brief etiological exploration of the stigmatization of PWAs will
be followed by a discussion of the legal responsibilities and the
perhaps more complex ethical challenges AIDS poses for the next
decade.
I. STIGMATIZATION OF PWAs
"[T]he anatomy of any myth is the anatomy of the men
who believed in it and suffered by it. '" 5
It may be considered an accident of history that AIDS was
discovered in the gay community of the United States. It could
just as easily have been discovered in a number of other coun-
tries. Had it been discovered in Africa, for example, it might have
been known as a heterosexual disease which, because it is sexually
transmitted, also affects gay men. Thus the regrettable, universal
and false impression that AIDS is a "gay" disease might not have
come about." Unfortunately, the history of this disease cannot be
rewritten, and the social and cultural meanings of AIDS continue
to contribute to widespread stigmatization of PWAs, frequently
resulting in AIDS discrimination.
Undoubtedly, one of the most serious threats PWAs face is
the powerful social stigma associated with having AIDS. Thus far,
AIDS has had its greatest impact on groups perceived by many as
socially "deviant." These groups include gay and bisexual men
and intravenous (IV) drug abusers. 7 The indigent and black and
hispanic racial minorities are also disproportionately affected.,
This stigma has very real and crippling results: PWAs and indi-
viduals who have tested positive for the HIV antibody often lose
their jobs and insurance benefits. Some have been denied educa-
5. M. KEMPTON, PART OF OUR TIME 10 (1955).
6. See International Epidemiology, supra note 4, at 84-85.
7. Quarterly Report to the Domestic Policy Council on the Prevalence and Rate of
Spread of HII'and AIDS in the United States, 37 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WEEKLY
REP. 223, 224 (1988) (68% of cases reported in 1987 were among homosexual
and bisexual men and 19% were among IV drug abusers).
8. See Jakush, AIDS: The Disease and Its Implications for Dentistry, 115 J. AM.
DENTAL A. 394, 396 (1987).
800 [Vol. 34: p. 799
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tional opportunities and medical care.9
During the social crisis of an epidemic, further stigmatization
of already disenfranchised groups serves to project fears of conta-
gion, immorality and mortality outside the normative social
group. This, of course, occurs at great expense to the non-nor-
mative groups by compounding their stigmatization. Not only are
AIDS victims branded as belonging to socially "deviant" groups,
they are forced to suffer the consequences of being stigmatized
individuals with a stigmatized life-threatening disease.' 0
As a result of the stigma associated with AIDS, PWAs fre-
quently encounter unfair discrimination. I I Like other forms of
discrimination, AIDS discrimination is "the unfair treatment of
individuals based upon irrational fears and prejudices about
groups."' 2 The resulting "us" versus "them" mentality is poten-
tially very costly to society as a whole. Because stigmatized
groups, whether HIV-infected or not, fear discrimination, they
may naturally be less willing to participate voluntarily in society's
efforts to control the spread of AIDS.:I
AIDS engenders much fear and apprehension. For many
people, including some health care providers, "AIDS carries with
it all the connotations of sin" and images of an illicit disease asso-
ciated with illicit behavior.' 4 Two important aspects of "AIDS
fear" are the fear of disease and of social disorder.15
Far more complex than the obvious and possibly realistic fear
9. See Koenig, Ethical and Legal Issues in the AIDS Epidemic, NURSING CARE OF
THE PERSON WITH AIDS/ARC 287, 288 (A. Lewis ed. 1988).
10. See Farrell, AIDS Patients: Values in Conflict, 10 CRITICAL CARE NURSING
Q. 74, 75 (1987) (quoting Loewy & Smith, Duty to Treat AIDS Patients May Be
Clouded by Fears, 2 MED. ETHICS ADVISOR 29, 31 (1986)).
11. Not only are PWAs discriminated against in housing, education and em-
ployment, but they often experience unfair treatment discrimination. Treat-
ment discrimination occurs when health care providers must make decisions
about who is to receive a scarce medical resource, whether it be a nurse's time or
a donor's kidney. Necessarily, the decision to give to one patient means another
must go without. This form of discrimination, however, can be either fair or
unfair. Treatment discrimination based on the urgency of a patient's need or
some other objective medical fact is "fair discrimination." Treatment discrimi-
nation based on fear, prejudice or the patient's personal attributes is "unfair
discrimination." AIDS stigma often results in unfair discrimination against
PWAs in treatment decisions.
12. Schulman, AIDS Discrimination: Its Nature, M eaning and Function, 12 NOVA
L. REV. 1113, 1114 (1988).
13. See id. at 1116. "Fear of stigmatized groups ... intensifies the epidemic
through its divisiveness at a time when social cooperation is essential." Id.
14. Loewy & Smith, Duty to Treat AIDS Patients May Be Clouded by Fears, 2
MED. ErhIcs ADVISOR 29, 29 (1986).
15. Schulman, supra note 12, at 1115.
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of contagion, fear of AIDS as a disease is compounded by a
number of factors. First, human sexuality and, more specifically,
homosexuality and bisexuality, are issues about which many
members of society are uncomfortable and ill-informed. A sec-
ond factor is society's ambivalence regarding mental illness. As
treatment modalities improve and life expectancy lengthens for
PWAs, it is likely that we will see greatly increased numbers of
HIV-demented people. 1 This will exact increased physical and
fiscal demands on existing and future mental health care systems
as well as other social resources. 17 The invariably fatal prognosis
is a third factor which contributes to the fear of AIDS as a dis-
ease. "' The fear of death is primal and pervasive, even among
health care providers.'!' In fact, health practitioners' personal
16. Id. at 1117. Human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) penetrates nervous
cells resulting in damage to the brain and nervous system in approximately 60%
of AIDS patients. Felix, Mueller & Schmid, AIDS in the Long-Term Care Setting, 7
ST. Louis PUB. L. REV. 115, 117 (1988). The neurological damage results in
cognitive changes which progress quickly from mild confusion to inability to
speak or function independently. Barnes, AIDS-Related Brain Damage Unexplained,
232 SCIENCE 1091, 1091 (1986). Motor problems such as poor coordination
accompany the cognitive changes. Id. For a detailed discussion of AIDS demen-
tia, see id.
17. One economist estimates the lifetime costs for an AIDS patient's medi-
cal care, encompassing hospital, physician, drug (including AZT) and home-care
nursing costs, at $57,000 in 1988 and $61,000 in 1991. Hellinger, Forecasting the
Personal Medical Care Costs of AIDS from 1988 Through 1991, 103 PUB. HEALTH REP.
309, 309 (1988). Three different 1986 studies estimated the lifetime cost per
AIDS patient at $150,000, $94,000 and $70,000 respectively. Id. at 312. These
estimates included hospital costs and $2,000-$4,000 for non-inpatient costs. Id.
at 311-12. Some commentators suggest that many AIDS patients remain in hos-
pitals longer than necessary because home health care and community-based
services are not widely available. Felix, Mueller & Schmid, supra note 16, at 115-
16. Therefore, if more care were available on an outpatient basis or in long-
term care facilities rather than hospitals, the average cost per AIDS patient
would be much less. Id. at 116. In fact, it has been noted that the "average
length of [hospital] stay has dropped from 18 to 11 days because of increased
treatment in outpatient settings." Hellinger, supra, at 313. Hellinger attributes
the vast disparity between the high 1986 estimated cost of $150,000 and the
1988 estimate of $57,000 to efficiency in treatment and less dependency on hos-
pital services. Id.
One should rely on these cost estimates with caution as many factors which
contribute to the costs may change in the future. Such factors include: (1) a
change in the predominant specific AIDS manifestation (e.g., Kaposi's sarcoma
which is less costly to treat than Pneumocystis carinii pneumonia); (2) a shift in the
geographic distribution of AIDS cases; (3) future scientific advances; and
(4) even less dependency on hospital services. Id. at 314.
18. Schulman, supra note 12, at 1117.
19. Even though the probability of dying from being struck by a bolt of
lightning exceeds the probability of dying from AIDS contracted on the job, the
fear of AIDS is very real and may overcome an individual's sense of professional
responsibility. Albert, A Right to Treatment for AIDS Patients?, 92 DICK. L. REV.
743, 745 (1988).
802 [Vol. 34: p. 799
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fears regarding mortality may be particularly exacerbated by a fa-
tal disease affecting large numbers of young, previously healthy
people-in other words, people very much like themselves.
The fear of social disorder, relative to the AIDS pandemic,
stems from the attrition of PWAs from the work force, thus re-
moving their economic contributions from society. This is fur-
ther compounded by their acutely increased needs for public
support for medical care, food and housing.20
Historically, society has dealt with the fear of social disorder
by focusing social panic onto such stigmatized groups. 2' This has
resulted in counterproductive scapegoating and isolation. For ex-
ample, in an effort to control the spread of sexually transmitted
diseases (STDs), 30,000 prostitutes were isolated during World
War 1.22 In spite of the infringement on the civil liberties of these
people, the incidence of STDs increased dramatically during this
period.23 Similarly, as a result of fear during World War II, the
United States Supreme Court upheld the exclusion of certain Jap-
anese-Americans from their homes.2 4
Fortunately, two recent legislative proposals that would have
resulted in the scapegoating and isolation of PWAs were not suc-
cessful. A prime example of the social panic engendered by AIDS
fear is a 1986 referendum supported by Lyndon LaRouche that
would have declared AIDS an infectious, contagious and easily
communicable disease.25 California voters defeated this legisla-
tion, legislation that would have mandated a quarantine of HIV-
infected persons in camps and would have resulted in the loss of
20. See Schulman, supra note 12, at 1117. The fear of social disorder is a
fear of chaos which may result from the increased demands and decreased eco-
nomic contributions of PWAs. Id.
21. Id. at 1118.
22. Brandt, AIDS: From Social Histo y to Social Policy, 14 LAW MED. & HEALTH
CARE 231, 233 (1986).
23. Id.
24. See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 219-20 (1944). The so-
cial fear which resulted in the 1942 detention of'Japanese-Americans has been
compared to the fear in the current AIDS crisis. See Barnes, AIDS and Mr. Kore-
matsu: linorities at Tines of Oisis, 7 ST. Louis U. PUB. L. REV. 35 (1988). Barnes
concludes that the painful and lasting social divisions which have iesulted from
the treatment ofJapanese-Americans should teach that "widespread HIV testing
without antidiscrimination laws [and] quarantining HIV-exposed people ... will
only exacerbate the crisis." Id. at 43. See also Schulman, supra note 12, at 1118
(shameful impulse of scapegoating was demonstrated in treatment ofJapanese-
Americans in World War II).
25. See Durham, The Ethical Dimensions of AIDS, in THE PERSON WITH AIDS:
NURSING PERSPECTIVES 229, 232 U. Durham & F. Cohen eds. 1987).
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employment of all infected food handlers and teachers. 26 In
1988, California voters soundly defeated the Dannemeyer "Re-
porting Exposure to AIDS Initiative" (Proposition 102), a law that
would have, among other things, eliminated all anonymous HIV
screening in California and would have allowed employers and
insurers to require HIV testing of applicants as a condition of em-
ployment and insurance coverage. 27 Such extreme measures are
irrational and counterproductive: few who believed that they had
been exposed to HIV through high risk behavior would volunta-
rily submit themselves to testing. In effect, such measures would
simply serve to drive AIDS underground and would surely thwart
public health efforts such as screening, counseling and education
to prevent the further spread of this deadly disease.
II. LEGAL RESPONSIBILITIES OF HEALTH CARE PROFESSIONALS
TO PROVIDE CARE FOR PWAs
"AIDS poses the most profound issues of constitu-
tional law and public health since the Supreme Court
approved compulsory immunization in 1905."28
PWAs must look to health care institutions, the employees of
such institutions and self-employed physicians for medical treat-
ment during the debilitating course of AIDS. The duties which
may be imposed on each of these entities to care for the PWA can
be quite dissimilar, as they rest on distinct theories.
One commentator has suggested that the common law doc-
trine of reliance upon a gratuitous undertaking guarantees the
PWA the right to emergency treatment in a hospital emergency
room.29 State statutes also may require a hospital to provide
26. Id.
27. See State Voters Defeat Reporting Initiative, Approve Criminal Suspect Testing
Measure, AIDS Pol'y & L., Nov. 16, 1988, at 1. However, the voters passed an-
other measure which would allow judges to order individuals charged with sex-
ual crimes to be involuntarily tested for HIV. Id.
28. Mills, Wofsy & Mills, The Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome: Infection Con-
trol and Public Health Law, 314 NEW ENG. J. MED. 931, 931 (1986).
29. Brennan, Ensuring Adequate Health Care for the Sick: The Challenge of the
Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome as an Occupational Disease, 1988 DUKE L.J. 29, 37-
38; see also Wilmington Gen. Hosp. v. Manlove, 174 A.2d 135, 140 (Del. 1961)
(to find liability, there must be unmistakable emergency and reliance on well-
established custom of emergency services). Under this common law doctrine,
proving that an unmistakable emergency exists may be an insurmountable hur-
dle for the PWA to overcome. See Fabian v. Matzko, 236 Pa. Super. 267, 269,
273, 344 A.2d 569, 570, 572 (1975) (telephone call to hospital indicating sud-
den, severe headache, vomiting and stiffness in back of neck does not amount to
unmistakable emergency when patient had seen family physician same day).
804 [Vol. 34: p. 799
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emergency services for the PWA. 30 Nevertheless, the right to re-
ceive emergency care does not provide a right to total health care,
as the PWA will frequently require care in nonemergency
situations. 3 1
Federal statutory provisions such as the Rehabilitation Act of
197332 and the Hospital Survey and Construction Act"" may pre-
vent certain hospitals from denying emergency as well as non-
emergency care to PWAs. These acts condition the receipt of
federal funds upon the absence of discrimination in general.3 4 As
neither of these acts has been tested in the AIDS context, it is
difficult to be certain of their effectiveness in assuring health care
for PWAs.: 5
Even if an institutional duty to provide care to PWAs is recog-
nized, there is still a practical problem on an individual level.
Specifically, when a health care institution accepts PWAs as pa-
tients, can it require its employees to provide care for them? If
employees of health care institutions fail to carry out patient as-
30. See Brennan, supra note 29, at 38; see also Thompson v. Sun City Com-
munity Hosp., Inc., 141 Ariz. 597, 688 P.2d 605 (1984). In Thompson, the Ari-
zona Supreme Court held that the statutory standard of care embodied public
policy which required "licensed hospitals in this state ... to accept and render
emergency care to all patients who present themselves in need of such care." Id.
at 602, 688 P.2d at 610.
31. Brennan, supra note 29, at 39.
32. 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-796 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
33. 42 U.S.C. § 291 (1982). The Hospital Survey and Construction Act is
commonly known as the Hill-Burton Act. See Felix, Mueller & Schmid, supra
note 16, at 127.
34. The Rehabilitation Act provides in pertinent part: "No otherwise quali-
fied individual with handicaps . . . shall . . .be denied the benefits of, or be
subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal fi-
nancial assistance." 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). A regulation is-
sued pursuant to the Hospital Survey and Construction Act provides: "[A]
facility shall make the services provided in the facility ... constructed, modern-
ized or converted with Federal assistance under ... the Act available ... without
discrimination on . . .any .. .ground unrelated to an individual's need for the
service." 42 C.F.R. § 124.603(a)(1) (1987). See Felix, Mueller & Schmid, supra
note 16, at 123, 127. For a discussion of the possible impact of the Rehabilita-
tion Act on health care for PWAs, see Albert, supra note 19, at 759-62; Brennan,
supra note 29, at 41-42; Felix, Mueller & Schmid, supra note 16, at 123-27. For a
discussion of the possible impact of the Hospital Survey and Construction Act
on health care for PWAs, see Brennan, supra note 29, at 39-40; Felix, Mueller &
Schmid, supra note 16, at 127.
35. In School Board v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 289 (1987), the United States
Supreme Court held that "a person suffering from the contagious disease of
tuberculosis can be a handicapped person within the meaning of § 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973." One commentator has suggested that the Supreme
Court likewise will prohibit discrimination based on AIDS. Albert, supra note
19, at 771.
805
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signments, it is considered insubordination. M Therefore, physi-
cians and nurses may be disciplined for refusing to provide
medical and nursing care for PWAs.3 7 However, this general rule
would not be upheld if the health care employee genuinely be-
lieved that the institution was not following proper infection con-
trol guidelines.38 Under the Occupational Safety and Health Act
(OSHA),'"' the employee may complain about potentially unsafe
working conditions and refuse "in good faith to expose himself to
the dangerous condition" without fear of subsequent reprisals. 40
An employee may maintain a cause of action for retaliatory dis-
missal when fired for refusing to work under conditions that are
deemed unsafe. 4 1
For health care professionals working independently, re-
moved from the setting of health care institutions, there is less
institutional pressure to treat an AIDS patient. However, when
an independent physician establishes a professional relationship
with a PWA, the common law doctrine of abandonment may im-
pose a duty to continue to provide medical care. Under this doc-
trine, the physician cannot terminate the relationship unless the
patient no longer requires treatment for the ailment, or the stabi-
lized patient has been given notice adequate to permit the indi-
36. Creighton, LegalAspects of AIDS-Part II, NURSING MGMT., Dec. 1986, at
14. For a discussion of the ability of physicians who are not considered employ-
ees of health care institutions to refuse to provide medical treatment for PWAs,
see Brennan, supra note 29, at 35-37.
37. Creighton, supra note 36, at 14-15.
38. Id.
39. 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). One of the enumerated
purposes of OSHA is to "providle] medical criteria which will assure insofar as
practicable that no employee will suffer diminished health, functional capacity,
or life expectancy as a result of his work experience." Id. § 651 (b)(7). See OSHA
guidelines, which are not specific to AIDS, in 29 C.F.R. § 1910 (1987). The
Department of Labor has published advance notice of proposed rulemaking not-
ing that no OSHA guideline has been issued specific to reducing occupational
exposure to AIDS and inviting comment to ensure a full airing of the issues.
Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 52 Fed. Reg. 45,438 (1987).
40. 29 C.F.R. § 1977.12 (1987). However, in order for an employee to re-
fuse to work, the employee must have no reasonable alternative such as correc-
tion of the dangerous condition after having notified the employer. Id.
§ 1977.12(b)(2). In addition, the condition must be such that a reasonable per-
son would conclude that there was insufficient time to "resort to regular statu-
tory enforcement channels." Id.
41. See Hentzel v. Singer Co., 138 Cal. App. 3d 290, 293, 304, 188 Cal.
Rptr. 159, 160, 168 (1982). Hentzel protested alleged unsafe working condi-
tions caused by smoking iil the workplace. Id. at 293, 188 Cal. Rptr. at 160. The
court ruled that under California law, Hentzel had a cause of action whether or
not an OSHA standard or order was violated. Id. at 300-01, 188 Cal. Rptr. at
165. See also Creighton, supra note 36, at 14-15 (employee can refuse to work
where conditions are proven unsafe).
806 [Vol. 34: p. 799
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vidual to locate an equally qualified replacement. 42 Therefore, as
Brennan observes, when a PWA enters a stable phase, the physi-
cian may withdraw from the relationship without liability.43 Per-
haps the greatest obstacle to imposing a legal duty under the
doctrine of abandonment is that it only applies after the physi-
cian-patient relationship has begun. It does nothing to prevent a
physician from declining to establish such a relationship in the
first place. 4 4
III. ETHICAL CHALLENGES TO HEALTH CARE PROFESSIONALS
"The need for nursing is universal. Inherent in
nursing is respect for life, dignity and rights of man. It
is unrestricted by considerations of nationality, race,
creed, color, age, sex, politics or social status.."45
As members of society, health care professionals also partici-
pate in the stigmatization of PWAs. A number of research studies
have documented negative attitudes of physicians and nurses to-
ward gay men, IV drug abusers and PWAs in general. 4 1" These
attitudes may be based on the practitioners' opinions about such
a patient's personal attributes, lifestyle or personal worth.
42. Brennan, supra note 29, at 35. The cause of action underlying the doc-
trine of abandonment is breach of the implied contract between the physician
and patient. Id. at 35-36. In Miller v. Greater Southeast Community Hospital,
508 A.2d 927 (D.C. 1986), the court limited the application of the doctrine of
abandonment to situations in which the patient is in need of immediate medical
attention. However, if the patient does not need immediate care, providing the
patient with a list of alternative physicians will relieve the physician from liabil-
ity. Id. at 929.
43. Brennan, supra note 29, at 37. "The majority of AIDS patients' clinical
courses are quite stable at times." Id.
44. For a discussion of the physician's ethical duty to treat an AIDS patient,
see infra notes 57-63 and accompanying text.
45. INTERNATIONAL COUNCIL OF NURSES, INTERNATIONAL COUNCIL OF
NURSES CODE FOR NURSES: ETHICAL CONCEPTS APPLIED TO NURSING (1973), re-
printed in E. BANDMAN & B. BANDMAN, NURSING ETHICS IN THE LIFE SPAN 272
(1985).
46. Kelly, St. Lawrence, Smith, Hood & Cook, Stigmatization of AIDS Patients
b'-y Physicians, 77 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 789, 790-91 (1987) (randomly selected phy-
sicians in three-city sample viewed AIDS patients as more deserving of illness
and less deserving of sympathy than leukemia patients); Kelly, St. Lawrence,
Hood, Smith & Cook, Nurses'Attitudes Toward AIDS, J. CONTINUING EDUC. NURS-
ING Mar./Apr. 1988, at 78, 81 (1988) (study of 166 nurses showed more negative
attitude toward PWAs than leukemia patients); see also Wachter, Cooke,
Hopewell & Luce, Attitudes of Medical Residents Regarding Intensive Care for Patients
with the Acquired Immunodeficiencv Syndrome, 148 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 149, 152
(1988) (authors suspect stress of caring for large numbers of PWAs may create
attitude of hopelessness in health care provider).
807
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Whatever their origins, such attitudes engender social prejudice
from which discrimination emerges.
The complex phenomenon of AIDS stigma, in itself, poses
major personal and professional challenges to health practition-
ers who wish to provide PWAs with optimal, sensitive health care.
Understanding the social etiology of the AIDS stigma should as-
sist health professionals to: (1) reject and counteract social ste-
reotypes; (2) assess their personal values and risks more
accurately; and (3) identify their professional responsibilities in
providing health care which demonstrates value for the personal
autonomy of PWAs.
A. Personal Safety
The health professions, particularly nursing, have long and
distinguished histories replete with examples of care givers who
knowingly risked their personal safety to help others. Providing
care for PWAs presents at least some degree of risk to the physical
well-being of health practitioners. For example, current estimates
place the risk of becoming HIV-infected as a result of an acciden-
tal needlestick injury at approximately 0.13% to 0.39%. 4 7 Thus,
most health care providers are at far greater risk of contracting
other serious infectious diseases such as hepatitis-B in the health
care setting than AIDS.4 1 Although the risk of becoming HIV-
infected while providing patient care is minimal, it must be fac-
tored into the health practitioner's estimation of personal risk.
Recognizing the conflict between the responsibility to provide
care and a practitioner's concerns for personal safety, profes-
sional associations have promulgated numerous official state-
ments in an attempt to guide the practitioner in balancing these
competing interests.
For example, in 1986, the Committee on Ethics of the Ameri-
can Nurses' Association (ANA) published a position paper enti-
tled Statement Regarding Risk Versus Responsibility in Providing Nursing
Care.4a1 This document lists four fundamental criteria for nurses
to consider when differentiating between a moral duty and a moral
47. Friedland & Klein, Transnission of the Human Immunodeficiecv Virus, 317
NEW ENG. J. MED. 1125, 1126-27 (1987).
48. Koenig, supra note 9, at 296.
49. AMERICAN NURSES' AssocIATION COMMI'ITEE ON ETHICS, AMERICAN
NURSES' ASSOCIATION, STATEMENT REGARDING RISK VERSUS RESPONSIBII.ITY IN
PROVIDING NURSING CARE, in ETHics IN NURSING: POSITION STATEMENTS AND
GUIDILINES 6, 6-7 (1988) [hereinafter ANA, RISK STATEMENT]. For the full text
of the ANA's Risk Statement, see ifia Appendix A.
[Vol. 34: p. 799808
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option to provide care for patients with communicable or infec-
tious diseases. These criteria are as follows:
1. The patient is at significant risk of harm, loss, or
damage if the nurse does not assist.
2. The nurse's intervention or care is directly rele-
vant to preventing harm.
3. The nurse's care will probably prevent harm,
loss, or damage to the patient.
4. The benefit the patient will gain outweighs any
harm the nurse might incur and does not present more
than minimal risk to the health care provider..5 11
If all of the above criteria are satisfied, the nurse is morally
obligated to provide care.5 1 If, however, one of these criteria is
not met, the nurse may exercise a moral option to provide care or
to not provide care. 52 The nurse must arrive at an ethically de-
fensible decision by weighing personal risk against the moral re-
sponsibility to provide care. For example, it may reasonably be
argued that nurses who are immunosuppressed or who are receiv-
ing immunosuppressant therapy may choose to exercise their
moral option by not providing care for PWAs. 5 " However, in
most instances, the nurse will be morally obligated to provide
care for PWAs, given the minimal risk of becoming infected.
An additional consideration impacting a health care practi-
tioner's choice is the environment and conditions under which
the practitioner is expected to work. For instance, health care
providers may ethically exercise their moral option not to provide
care when the employing agency is not in compliance with cur-
rently accepted guidelines to prevent transmission of HIV in the
health care environment. 54 Clearly, an employer has an obliga-
tion to comply with such guidelines as the Centers for Disease
Control's (CDC) Recommendations for Prevention of HIV Transmission
in Health-Care Settings. 55 Employers are thus obligated to provide
50. ANA, Risx STATEMENT, supra note 49, at 7.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id. See also Brener & Brown, Learning lo Care for Clients with AIDS-The
Practicum Controversv, 7 NURSING & HEALTH CARP, 251, 252 (1986) ("[Nursing]
students with active infections, those who are themselves immunosuppressed,
and those who are pregnant should not be assigned as primary providers for
AIDS clients.").
54. See supra notes 36-41 and accompanying text.
55. Recommendalions foi Prevention of 1111' Transmission in lhealth-Care Seltiiigs,
36 MORBIDITY & MORTAIrY WEKLY Rn:i'. (Supp. Aug. 21, 1987). This docu-
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resources necessary for proper infection control including appro-
priate equipment, education, enforcement and evaluation on an
ongoing basis. 56 However, there are no "cookbook" solutions
when the employer significantly fails to comply with such guide-
lines. Ultimately, health care professionals are responsible for
their own ethical decisions, even when others act irresponsibly.
Like those in the nursing community, many physicians and
medical students have expressed concern about the possible
transmission of HIV in the health care setting, particularly in
clinical settings such as the operating room or cardiac catheteriza-
tion laboratory where invasive procedures are performed. The
Association of American Medical Colleges (AAMC), taking special
note of these fears and concerns, has determined: "Medical stu-
dents, residents, and faculty members have a fundamental re-
sponsibility to provide care to all patients assigned to them,
regardless of diagnosis."' 57 According to the AAMC, to best ad-
dress these fears and concerns, as well as to satisfy this responsi-
bility, it is necessary to provide: (1) an accurate portrayal of the
personal risks involved in medical practice to prospective medical
students; (2) timely information regarding the risk of HIV trans-
mission in clinical settings; (3) training in protective measures
and monitoring of compliance with prescribed infection control
guidelines; (4) facilities, equipment and personnel appropriate to
avoid unnecessary risk; and (5) counseling and continuing educa-
tion for recalcitrant medical practitioners. 58
The Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs (CETA) of the
American Medical Association (AMA) squarely addressed the
conflict between personal safety and the responsibility to provide
care when it issued a report entitled Ethical Issues Involved in the
Growing AIDS Crisis. In this report, the CEJA mandated:
ment is often referred to as Universal Precautions and is updated in Update: Uni-
versal Precautions for Prevention o] Transmission of Human Immunodeficiency I'irus,
Hepatitis B Virus, and Other Bloodhorne Pathogens in Health-Care Settings, 37 MORBID-
ITY & MORTALITY WEEKLY REP. 377 (1988). The 1988 update clarifies a number
of issues including: "1) body fluids to which universal precautions apply, 2) use
of protective barriers, 3) use of gloves for phlebotomy, 4) selection of gloves for
use while observing universal precautions, and 5) need for making changes in
waste management programs as a result of adopting universal precautions." Id.
at 378.
56. See Schobel, Management's Responsibility to Deal Effectively with the Risk of
HII' Exposure for Healthcare Workers, NURSING MGMT., Mar. 1988, at 38, 42.
57. Professioiial Responsibility in Treating AIDS Patients, 63 J. MED. EDUc. 587,
589 (1988).
58. Id. at 590.
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A physician may not ethically refuse to treat a patient
whose condition is within the physician's current realm
of competence solely because the patient is [HIV] sero-
positive. The tradition of the American Medical Associa-
tion, since its organization in 1847, is that: "when an
epidemic prevails, a physician must continue his labors
without regard to the risk of his own health. ' ' -r,(
Thus, physicians, like nurses, are enjoined by their profes-
sional association to assume at least some degree of personal risk
to insure that PWAs receive health care."" The CEJA report also
denounced discrimination by health care providers: "A person
who is afflicted with AIDS needs competent, compassionate treat-
ment. Neither those who have the disease nor those who have
been infected with the virus should be subjected to discrimination
based on fear or prejudice, least of all by members of the health
care community."'
As one commentator has noted, an apparent conflict exists
between the CEJA statement mandating treatment of HIV sero-
positive patients and the sixth provision of the AMA Principles of
Medical Ethics, which provides: "A physician shall, in the provision
of appropriate patient care, except in emergencies, be free to
choose whom to serve, with whom to associate, and the environ-
ment in which to provide medical services."' 2 The CEJA has at-
tempted to resolve this conflict by interpreting the principle
narrowly. The CEJA recognizes the autonomy of physicians to
make such decisions; however, this autonomy is not absolute.
The principle is construed to give physicians the freedom to de-
cide how, where and with whom to conduct their practices, but
such freedom must not be used as a front to hide illegal or invidi-
ous discrimination. 63
Finally, dentists, too, are concerned about AIDS and the po-
tential transmission of HIV in the practice setting. To guide its
members, in 1987, the American Dental Association (ADA)
59. COUNCIL ON ETHICAL AND JUDICIAL AFFAIRS, AMERICAN MEDICAL Asso-
CIATION, ETHICAL ISSUES INVOLVED IN THE GROWING AIDS CRISIS'(1988) [herein-
after CEJA, ETHICAL ISSUES].
60. Fowler, Acquired Immunodeficiencv Syndrome and Refusal to Provide Care,
HEART & LUNG, Mar. 1988, at 213, 213.
61. CEJA, ETHICAL ISSUES, supra note 59.
62. COUNCIL ON ETHICAL AND JUDICIAL AFFAIRS, AMERICAN MEDICAL Asso-
CIATION, CURRENT OPINIONS OF TIlE COUNCIL ON ETHICAL AND JUDICIAL AFFAIRS
OF TIlE AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION at ix (1986).
63. Fowler, supra note 60, at 213.
13
Forrester: AIDS: The Responsibility to Care
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1989
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
adopted a policy statement on AIDS and HIV infection which
states: "The Association believes that HIV-infected individuals
should be treated with compassion and dignity .... [I]ndividuals
with HIV infection should have access to dental treatment." '" 4
The ADA statement, like those of other professional associations,
attempts to balance the medical needs of the dental patient
against the interests of health practitioners in personal safety and
avoiding unreasonable risks of disease.65
Each of the official positions and policy statements reviewed
highlights and recognizes the responsibility of health profession-
als for those with a communicable, fatal disease and the risk in-
volved. While no statement can purport to strike a particular
balance for each professional faced with making a choice, such
statements should promote rational decisions based on informa-
tion regarding actual risks and the efficacy of protective measures.
Furthermore, as these statements suggest, fear and prejudice are
never legitimate grounds for refusing to provide care. Nor is it
morally acceptable for health practitioners in particular to display
prejudice toward a patient. Rather, health professionals have a
moral duty to provide compassionate, competent health care to
PWAs, notwithstanding the fact that providing care poses some
degree of personal risk.""
B. Personal and Professional Values
Holistic health care for PWAs requires that health care prov-
iders gain insight into their own opinions, attitudes and values. 67
For example, physicians and nurses typically place a high value on
health and health-seeking behaviors in patients. PWAs who con-
tinue to abuse IV drugs or to engage in high-risk sexual activity
are often perceived as non-health seeking and, therefore, pose a
substantial challenge to health practitioners attempting to pro-
vide nonjudgmental care. Such conflicting value systems are al-
most sure to result in ineffective physician-patient and nurse-
patient relationships."" To effectively counter this, health care
providers must clarify their values.(ill This process fosters per-
sonal and professional growth and is accomplished by frank dis-
64. AMERICAN DENTAL AsSOCIATION, PoLc STATEMENT ON AIDS, HIV IN-
FECTION AND TIE PRACTICE OF I)ENISTRY (1987).
65. See Fowler, supra note 60, at 214.
66. See id.
67. Farrell, supra note 10, at 75.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 74, 75.
812 [Vol. 34: p. 799
14
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 34, Iss. 5 [1989], Art. 3
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol34/iss5/3
1989] RESPONSIBILITY OF HEALTH-CARE PROFESSIONALS
cussion of conflicting values and participation in ethics
committees and organized educational programs regarding AIDS
and PWAs. 70
Excellent health care for PWAs is characterized by open in-
terpersonal communication and social support.7 1 Effective care
for PWAs, as with all patients, requires an accepting, nonjudg-
mental approach by competent health professionals. Such practi-
tioners are unencumbered by unrealistic fears of contagion or
unfair personal prejudices.
Again, the ANA offers guidance regarding personal risk, so-
cial prejudice and moral responsibility: "Nursing is resolute in its
perspective that care should be delivered without prejudice, and
it makes no allowance for use of the patient's personal attributes,
socioeconomic status, or the nature of the health problem as
grounds for discrimination." 72 Nursing's code of professional
ethics insists that "[t]he need for health care is universal, tran-
scending all national, ethnic, racial, religious, cultural, political,
educational, economic, developmental, personality, role, and sex-
ual differences. Nursing care is delivered without prejudicial
behavior." 73
At least two conclusions can be drawn from these statements
with regard to PWAs. First, although it is true that health care
professionals may exercise a moral option and refuse to provide
care where there exists an irreducible risk to personal safety
which they perceive to be too great, there is no instance in which
health practitioners can ethically refuse to provide care based on
personal prejudice.74 Second, the personal attributes of patients
and the social aspects of their illness are to be used only for their
benefit in individualizing their care, not to their detriment.75
C. Patient Autonomy
It is generally accepted that it is the right of the patient to
make decisions regarding what constitutes appropriate medical
treatment. 7" However, the ethical challenge to respect PWAs' au-
tonomy in making such decisions is complicated by many fac-
70. Id. at 76.
7 1. Id. at. 75.
72. ANA, RIsK STATEMENT, $lvi note 49, at 6.
73. AMERICAN NURSES' AssocIATION, CODE FOR NURSES WITH INTERPRETIVE
STATEMENTS (1985).
74. Fowler, supra note 60, at 214.
75. Id.
76. Koenig, supra note 9, at 289.
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tors. 77 For example, AIDS raises special considerations regarding
autonomy due to the high incidence of either primary HIV-infec-
tion of the brain or secondary opportunistic infections resulting
in dementia or other mental impairment. 78 PWAs are often too
impaired to competently make health care decisions at those criti-
cal times when such decisions must be made. 7'1
Thus, health care providers have an ethical obligation to as-
sist PWAs in making health care decisions early in the course of
the disease." Advance directives, such as a durable power of at-
torney for health care (DPAHC), should be discussed with pa-
tients in a frank and thoughtful way."' These documents allow
77. Id.
78. Id. For a discussion of AIDS dementia, see supra note 16 and accompa-
nying text.
79. Koenig, supra note 9, at 289.
80. When a patient is diagnosed with AIDS, the PWA should be introduced
to means to ensure that medical treatment is administered in a manner and to
the extent the PWA deems appropriate, since it is likely that this is "one of the
last things on his mind." Mock & Tobin, Estate Planning for Clients with AIDS, 7
ST. Louis U. PUB. L. REV. 177, 207 (1988).
81. Advance directives refer to any number of legal methods which allow
patients to specify their wishes regarding health care, especially life-sustaining
treatment, in advance of losing the capacity to do so. Koenig, supra note 9, at
290. In particular, a power of attorney establishes a principal-agent relationship
in which the attorney-in-fact-the agent chosen by the PWA-may make certain
decisions on behalf of the principal-the PWA. Mock & Tobin, supra note 80, at
201. However, the principal-agent relationship will end when the principal be-
comes incompetent unless a durable power of attorney has been established. Id.
at 202. The document establishing the durable power of attorney must contain
words to the effect that the relationship is not "affected by subsequent disability
or capacity of the principal." Id. at 202 n.137 (quoting UNIFORM PROBATE CODE
§ 5-501 (1982)). See also Roberts, Use of a Durable Power of Attorney in Asset A1anage-
meit, 3 ME. B.J. 32, 33 (1988) (durable power of attorney survives only if written
and states that power is not affected by disability of principal). The existence of
a durable power of attorney will obviate the need for a court-appointed conser-
vator which is both time consuming and expensive. Valente & Michaels, Power of
Attorney: An Update, N.Y.L.J., Oct. 28, 1988, at 3, col. I.
The AIDS patient may specify that the agent is empowered to direct his
medical treatment. Mock & Tobin, supra note 80, at 201. However, not all states
permit a durable power of attorney for health care decisions. Valente &
Michaels, supra, at 4. Even in those states that do, the statutes vary considerably.
For example, Maine's statute explicitly provides for an agent to direct medical
treatment for the principal. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 18-A, § 5-501 (West Supp.
1988). See Roberts, supra, at 33. The California statute specifically authorizes a
durable power of attorney for health care which permits the principal to make
health care decisions including "consent, refusal of consent, or withdrawal of
consent to health care." See CAL. CIv. CODE § 2430 (West Supp. 1989). Penn-
sylvania, while not specifically referring to a durable power of attorney for health
care, does permit the attorney-in-fact to "arrange for and consent io medical,
therapeutical and surgical procedures for the principal." See 20 PA. CONS. STAT.
ANN. § 5603(h) (Purdon 1988).
The PWA may retain control of healih care decisions until he becomes in-
[Vol. 34: p. 799
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patients to specify treatment preferences and designate a surro-
gate to make decisions about medical care if they become incom-
petent to do so.8 2 Proxy decision makers are particularly helpful
in planning care for many gay men who wish to have their life
partner rather than a legally-sanctioned family member make de-
cisions on their behalf. Knowledgeable health practitioners have
a responsibility to anticipate the need for advance directives and
initiate discussion of such documents with PWAs .13
Other ethical challenges confront health practitioners when
the expectations and treatment preferences of PWAs or their
proxy decision makers are inconsistent with those of the health
team or exceed medical realities. For example, one study of
PWAs indicated that a sample of gay men, the majority of whom
were well educated, significantly overestimated their chances of
competent to do so if a springing durable power of attorney is executed in which
the document states that the power does not come into existence until the PWA
becomes disabled. Roberts, supra, at 33. However, not all states permit use of
the springing power of attorney. Valente & Michaels, supra, at 3. When drafting
a springing power of attorney, issues such as who decides when the principal is
incompetent so that the power springs into effect and what constitutes incompe-
tence must be resolved. Id. at 4.
Another option which enables the PWA to direct future medical treatments
is the living will. Mock & Tobin, supra note 80, at 204. Through this device,
patients may refuse "treatment which merely prolongs their lives." Id. For a
detailed discussion of living wills, see Comment, Aaine's Living IVill Act and the
Termination of Life-Sustaining Medical Procedures, 39 ME. L. REv. 83 (1987).
Even beyond treatment issues are issues of disposition of property. Gay
AIDS patients may wish to use nontestamentary means of property disposition,
as disappointed takers may contest the will, arguing that the testator's sexual
orientation is a "mental aberration" and therefore, the will is invalid because the
requisite testamentary capacity was lacking. Mock & Tobin, supra note 80, at
179. AIDS dementia presents yet another ground for challenging the capacity of
a PWA to provide for a valid distribution of his property. Id. For a discussion of
AIDS dementia, see supra note 16 and accompanying text.
However, if a gay client insists on a will, the attorney should establish a
record of competency by: (1) executing the will as soon as possible after diagno-
sis; (2) asking the testator specific questions at the time of execution to establish
his competency before witnesses; (3) videotaping the entire execution process;
(4) having the testator examined by a trained professional as proximately to the
time of execution as possible; (5) including clauses in the will in which the testa-
tor acknowledges family members; and (6) choosing disinterested witnesses of
high caliber. Mock & Tobin, supra note 80, at 182-83.
The attorney should encourage use of nontestamentary disposition such as
joint tenancies, intervivos trusts, life insurance policies and gifts. Id. at 191.
The gay client with AIDS can leave his property to a significant other if the prop-
erty is held in ajoint tenancy with a right of survivorship. However, because the
client relinquishes a certain amount of control in the joint tenancy, a revocable
intervivos trust, which may be altered or terminated, may be preferable. Id. at
192-93.
82. Koenig, supra note 9, at 290.
83. Id. at 291.
17
Forrester: AIDS: The Responsibility to Care
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1989
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
surviving intensive care treatment for Pneumocystis carinii pneumo-
nia-fifty-five percent of this sample of 118 men wanted mechani-
cal ventilation and forty-six percent wanted cardiopulmonary
resuscitation. 84 Such unrealistic expectations seriously impair the
ability of patients to accurately evaluate the risk-benefit ratio in
care planning and, thus, their ability to give truly informed
consent. 85
Medical and nursing paternalism is very tempting in such in-
stances. 813 However, even though altruistically motivated, pater-
nalism by definition negates the ethical principle of patient
autonomy. Health professionals are ethically obliged to be
knowledgeable regarding currently available therapies as well as
their potential risks and benefits for PWAs. Furthermore, health
practitioners must communicate this information in a way that is
sensitive, supportive and truthful to help PWAs make immediate
decisions about treatment preferences and foresee the need to
document their wishes about life-sustaining intervention or to
designate a proxy to carry out their wishes when they become un-
able to act for themselves.
D. AIDS Treatment
As previously noted, the health professions recognize an eth-
ical obligation to provide care for PWAs. 87 To meet this obliga-
tion, health science faculty and practitioners have an ethical
responsibility to be sufficiently knowledgeable about the disease
to: (1) overcome their fears and personal prejudices; (2) prevent
transmission of HIV through occupational exposure; and (3) pro-
vide competent, safe, quality care. The health professions, there-
fore, have a responsibility to assist health care practitioners in
meeting these objectives.
The next decade should bring a marked increase in efforts to
further educate health care professionals and the public about
AIDS. These efforts may best be conducted through the various
health science academic curricula and professional associations.
Just as there is no segment of society unaffected by AIDS, neither
is there an area of specialization in the health care professions
84. Steinbrook, Lo, Moulton, Saika, Hollander & Volberding, Preferences of
Homosexual Men with AIDS for Life-Sustaining Treatmen, 314 NEw ENG. J. MED. 457,
457-58 (1986).
85. Koenig, supra note 9, at 290.
86. Id.
87. For a discussion of the positions taken by various professional health
associations, see supra notes 49-66 and accompanying text.
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which is not directly affected by AIDS. Health professionals have
a responsibility to seek educational opportunities regarding
AIDS. It is incumbent upon all of the health science academic
programs and specialty associations to develop, implement and
evaluate AIDS educational programming for health care students,
practitioners and consumers of health care services.
E. AIDS Research
Health care researchers have an obligation to consider the
importance of AIDS to our national and international health.
Furthermore, health care professionals and scientists should
identify areas in which they might contribute individual and col-
laborative research efforts. In order to provide valuable contribu-
tions to the growing body of knowledge about AIDS as a disease
and the health care of PWAs, interdisciplinary studies should be
undertaken.8 8
As health care professionals become increasingly involved in
scientific study regarding AIDS and PWAs, many ethical dilemmas
emerge. Research involving highly stigmatized groups at risk of
unfair treatment discrimination" '  highlights ethical issues involv-
ing PWAs' rights to privacy, anonymity and confidentiality. For
example, how heavily does the individual's right to privacy weigh
in the balance against the potential social good of health re-
search? 111 And given the communal nature of in-patient care facil-
ities and our age of computer-stored (and, therefore, easily
accessible) patient records, how can research participants beguar-
anteed anonymity or confidentiality?! Also, since it is generally
agreed that intrusions into privacy in clinical care and research
require informed consent from participants, how can the ethical
participation of HIV-demented individuals be obtained? Finally,
do the incomplete or accidental findings of apparently sound sci-
entific inquiry hold potential threats of harm either to PWAs di-
rectly or by misdirecting future public policy regarding AIDS?
The personal and social risks to PWAs who agree to partici-
pate in AIDS research are high. Study participants must be fully
88. See Larson, Nursing Research and AIDS, 37 NURSING RES. 60, 60 (1988).
89. For a discussion of treatment discrimination, see supra note 11.
90. Farrell, supra note 10, at 78.
91. Id. Farrell notes that even though this problem is not unique to AIDS,
there may be a greater chance of misuse of information due to the public fear of
AIDS. Id. A possible solution is not to computerize results of AIDS testing.
The results could be manually delivered into the patient's chart and kept in a
sealed envelope. Id.
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informed about how research data will be collected, used, stored,
and who will have access to it.92 Researchers and clinicians must:
(1) faithfully adhere to published guidelines for research involv-
ing PWAs; (2) minimize intrusions into PWAs' privacy; (3) assure
anonymity whenever possible; (4) take necessary precautions to
ensure confidentiality; and (5) carefully consider the potential in-
fluence of study findings on the lives of PWAs and the course of
public policy 93
IV. CONCLUSION
All health care professionals must actively participate in an
organized response to the profound legal and ethical challenges
posed by AIDS in the next decade. An immediate response to the
AIDS pandemic should have three main objectives: (1) to prevent
HIV infection; (2) to provide care for those already HIV-infected;
and (3) to participate in national and international efforts to fight
AIDS and its associated stigma.
First, to prevent the spread of HIV infection, health profes-
sionals and lawmakers must base their actions on a sound epide-
miological understanding of AIDS. From this knowledge, the
concept that the proper focus of prevention is not membership in
a high-risk group or HIV-antibody status is derived. Information
and education are essential, but not enough. Only if health care
and legal professionals make themselves available in a supportive
social environment will prevention truly have a fair chance of
success.
The second objective, to provide care for those already HIV-
infected, requires that all PWAs receive humane care of a quality
at least equal to that provided for people suffering from other
diseases, as well as comprehensive support and services. Implicit
in this objective are the responsibilities health care and legal pro-
fessionals share: (1) to avail themselves of accurate, up-to-date
information about the occupational risks, epidemiology and treat-
ment of AIDS; (2) to act consistently with this knowledge both in
their personal and professional lives; and (3) to model appropri-
ate behavior in order to educate professional colleagues and the
public about AIDS.
The third objective is to encourage the participation of
health and legal professionals in national and international efforts
92. Durham, supra note 25, at 249.
93. Id. at 248-49.
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to fight AIDS and its associated stigma. As litigation in the courts
and debate in legislative bodies proliferate on issues such as the
civil liberties of PWAs, health and legal practitioners must actively
provide their colleagues and the public with accurate information
and leadership: "[H]ealth professionals, [particularly,] have an
obligation to engage in the ensuing national [and international]
debate about AIDS health policy issues in an informed man-
ner."9 4 Health and legal professionals must be a knowledgeable
and vocal force in future decision making regarding such issues as
international travel, AIDS in prisons, the neuropsychiatric aspects
of HIV infection and AIDS in the workplace.
The AIDS pandemic poses some of the most compelling
legal and ethical challenges for health care and legal professionals
imaginable. Some of these challenges are unique to AIDS; some
are common to other serious illnesses as well. The legal and ethi-
cal issues raised by AIDS are amplified by the urgency associated
with the pandemic and the complex psychological, political and
social problems it engenders. For present and future generations
of health care providers and legal professionals, the ultimate chal-
lenge of AIDS will be to provide sensitive, compassionate care
and counsel while balancing individual rights and liberties against
the duty to protect the health and safety of the public as a whole.
APPENDIX A
Statement Regarding Risk Versus Responsibility in
Providing Nursing Care*
This statement examines the question, "At what point does it
cease to be a nurse's duty to undergo risk for the benefit of the
patient?" That question is particularly relevant for nurses caring
for patients afflicted with communicable or infectious diseases
such as typhoid, tuberculosis, plague, Hansen's disease, influ-
enza, Hepatitis B, Legionnaires' disease, cytomegalovirus, and ac-
quired immune deficiency syndrome (AIDS). Not only must
nursing care be readily available to individuals afflicted with com-
municable or infectious diseases, but also nurses must be advised
on the risks and the responsibilities they face in providing care to
94. Koenig, supra note 9, at 288-89.
* AMERICAN NURSES' ASSOCIATION COMMITTEE ON ETIICS, AMERICAN
NURSES' ASSOCIATION, STATEMENT REGARDING RISK VERSUS RESPONSIBILITY IN
PROVIDING NURSING CARE in ETIIICS IN NURSING, POSITION STATEMENTS AND
GUIDELINES (1988).
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those individuals. Accepting personal risk that exceeds the limits
of duty is not morally obligatory; it is a moral option.
According to the Code for Nurses, nurses may morally refuse
to participate in care, but only on the grounds of either patient
advocacy or moral objection to a specific type of intervention.
Nursing is resolute in its perspective that care should be delivered
without prejudice, and it makes no allowance for use of the pa-
tient's personal attributes, socioeconomic status, or the nature of
the health problem as grounds for discrimination.
The first statement of the Code for Nurses says, "The nurse
provides services with respect for human dignity and the unique-
ness of the client unrestricted by considerations of social or eco-
nomic status, personal attributes, or the nature of health
problems." Here, the code is addressing the issue of nondiscrim-
ination in the allocation of nursing resources (a question of jus-
tice and fairness).
Historically, nurses have given care to those in need, even at
risk to their own health, life, or limb. Indeed, the Suggested Code of
1926 proclaims that "the most precious possession of this profes-
sion is the ideal of service, extending even to the sacrifice of life
itself. . . ." Nursing history is replete with examples of nurses
who have knowingly incurred great risk in order to care for those
in need of nursing or to contribute to the advancement of health
science. Contemporary nurses, too, knowingly place themselves
in jeopardy when giving care on the battlefield, in places of
squalor and poor sanitation at home or abroad, in situations of
natural or man-made disaster, and in dealing with persons with
communicable or infectious diseases.
As the Suggested Code of 1926 recognizes, the ideal of service
is, in fact, an ideal. There are limits to the personal risk of harm
the nurse can be expected to accept as a moral duty. The profes-
sion does not and cannot demand the sacrifice of the nurse's well-
being, physical, emotional, or otherwise, or the nurse's life for the
benefit of the patient.
For assistance in resolving the question of risk versus respon-
sibility, nurses must turn to the field of ethics for guidance. In
ethics, the differentiation between benefiting another as a moral
duty and benefiting another as a moral option is found in four
fundamental criteria. As applied to nursing, they are as follows:
1. The patient is at significant risk of harm, loss, or
damage if the nurse does not assist.
820 [Vol. 34: p. 799
22
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 34, Iss. 5 [1989], Art. 3
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol34/iss5/3
1989] RESPONSIBILITY OF HEALTH-CARE PROFESSIONALS 821
2. The nurse's intervention or care is directly relevant
to preventing harm.
3. The nurse's care will probably prevent harm, loss, or
damage to the patient.
4. The benefit the patient will gain outweighs any harm
the nurse might incur and does not present more
than minimal risk to the health care provider.
Nursing, as nursing, creates a special relationship between
nurse and patient, with special duties for the nurse. The nurse is
not a "stranger" and thus is not at liberty to walk away from those
in need of nursing assistance. The nurse is obliged to care for
those in need of nursing when all four of the criteria are met.
For example, in most instances, it would be considered mor-
ally obligatory for a nurse to give care to an AIDS patient. If the
nurse is immunosuppressed, however, it could reasonably be ar-
gued that the nurse is not morally obligated to care for that pa-
tient on the grounds that the fourth criterion, the most crucial,
has not been met. Apart from the issue of personal risk to the
nurse, it must be mentioned that it is incumbent upon the hospi-
tal or agency administration to provide adequate safeguards, such
as equipment and enforcement of procedures, for the protection
of the nursing staff.
Nursing is a caring profession, oriented toward patient advo-
cacy. Because of nursing's long history of standing ready to assist
the ill and the vulnerable in society, society has come to rely on
nursing and to expect that it will rise to the health demands of
virtually any occasion. In a sense, this reciprocity is crucial to the
profession. All must know that care will be given when needed
and that it will not be arbitrarily, prejudicially, or capriciously
denied.
Yet there are limits to the moral obligation of the individual
nurse to benefit patients. Beneficence stands as a moral duty in
those situations where the four criteria can be met. When not all
of the criteria can be met, the individual nurse must evaluate the
situation according to the criteria and choose whether or not to
go beyond the requirement of duty.
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